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a b s t r a c t 
Admission to universities is organised in a centralised scheme in Hungary. In this paper we investigate 
two major specialities of this application: ties and common quotas. A tie occur when some students have 
the same score at a programme. If not enough seats are available for the last tied group of applicants 
at a programme then there are three reasonable policies used in practice: 1) all must be rejected, as in 
Hungary 2) all can be accepted, as in Chile 3) a lottery decides which students are accepted from this 
group, as in Ireland. Even though student-optimal stable matchings can be computed efficiently for each 
of the above three cases, we developed (mixed) integer programming (IP) formulations for solving these 
problems, and compared the solutions obtained by the three policies for a real instance of the Hungarian 
application from 2008. In the case of Hungary common quotas arise from the faculty quotas imposed 
on their programmes and from the national quotas set for state-financed students in each subject. The 
overlapping structure of common quotas makes the computational problem of finding a stable solution 
NP-hard, even for strict rankings. In the case of ties and common quotas we propose two reasonable 
stable solution concepts for the Hungarian and Chilean policies. We developed (mixed) IP formulations 
for solving these stable matching problems and tested their performance on the large scale real instance 
from 2008 and also for one from 2009 under two different assumptions. We demonstrate that the most 
general case is also solvable in practice by IP technique. 
© 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 


























Gale and Shapley gave a standard model for college admissions 
 Gale & Shapley, 1962 ), and suggested stable matching for its so- 
ution. Intuitively, a matching is stable if an application to a col- 
ege is rejected because the college is already full with higher 
anked students. Gale and Shapley showed that a stable match- 
ng can always be found by the deferred-acceptance algorithm , 
hich runs in linear time in the number of applications, see e.g. 
anlove (2013) . Moreover, the student-oriented variant results in  Earlier results of this paper have been presented in two conference papers [5,6]. 
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approach, European Journal of Operational Research, https://doi.org/10. student-optimal stable matching, meaning that no student could 
et a better assignment in any other stable matching. The theory 
f stable matchings has intensively been studied since 1962 by 
athematicians/computer scientists (see e.g. Manlove, 2013 ) and 
conomists/game theorists (see e.g. Roth & Sotomayor, 1990 ). The 
ale-Shapley algorithm has also been used in practice all around 
he world ( Biró, 2017 ), first in 1952 in the US resident allocation
rogramme, called NRMP ( Roth, 1984 ), then also in school choice, 
.g. in Boston ( Abdulkadiro ̆glu, Pathak, & Roth, 2005a ) and New 
ork ( Abdulkadiro ̆glu, Pathak, Roth, & Sönmez, 2005b ). In Hungary, 
he national admission scheme for secondary schools follows the 
riginal Gale-Shapley model and algorithm ( Biró, 2014a ), and the 
igher education admission scheme also uses a heuristic solution 
ased on the Gale-Shapley algorithm ( Biró, 2014b ). 
The Hungarian higher education admission scheme have at 
east four important special features: presence of ties, lower and 
ommon quotas, and paired applications. The students submit 
reference list on the university programmes they apply to, and nder the CC BY-NC-ND license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) 
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similar. We also find that introduction of additional variables and 
2 The authors wrote “In principle, one could appeal to the integer programming 
method devised by Biró and McBride (2014) for this problem, that finds a stable 
outcome when it exists. However, such an approach was untenable in practice due 
to complexity, relative opaqueness, and the likelihood of an unreasonably large run 
time on our large problem.”re ranked according to their scores, which are of integer values 
urrently in the range of [0,500] higher score meaning better per- 
ormance. The solution by the coordinating agency is announced 
n terms of cutoff scores to be understood as follows: every stu- 
ent is admitted to the best programme of her preference where 
he achieved the cutoff score. A tie can occur when two or more 
tudents have the very same score at a programme they apply for. 
ies are never broken in Hungary, either all or none of the students 
n the tie are admitted, depending on the cutoff score. Lower quo- 
as are minimum requirements for the number of admitted stu- 
ents for each programme, which are set by the universities to 
ake the education economical. Applications by the students also 
nclude the contract term of the study, i.e., whether their study is 
unded by the state or privately. For every programme there is a 
ommon upper bound for the number of admitted students under 
ny contract term, and there are also nationwide common quotas 
or the number of students getting state funds in each subject (e.g., 
hemistry). Finally, the students applying for teachers’ programmes 
hould apply for pairs of programmes (such as Math-Physics). The 
atter feature was re-introduced in the application in 2010, but it 
as not present in 2008 and 2009, the years our analysis bears 
n in this paper. Further details of the application can be found in 
iró (2014b) . 
Each of the three special features (lower and common quotas 
nd paired applications) makes the problem NP-hard ( Biró, Fleiner, 
rving, & Manlove, 2010 ), only the case of ties is resolvable effi- 
iently ( Biró & Kiselgof, 2015 ). In a recent paper ( Ágoston, Biró, 
 McBride, 2016 ) Ágoston et al. studied the usage of integer pro- 
ramming techniques for finding stable solutions with regard to 
ach of these four special features separately, and they solved the 
ase of lower quotas for the real instance of 2008. We refer to 
his instance as 2008-Educatio instance, which was provided for 
esearch purpose by the coordinating governmental agency called 
ducatio kht, and contained all the relevant upper and lower quo- 
as in an anonym dataset. In this follow-up work we develop and 
est new IP formulations for the case of ties and common quo- 
as separately and then also for the case when both features are 
resent. So, the ultimate goal of this work was to suggest a so- 
ution concept for the college admission problem where ties and 
ommon quotas are also present, and to provide integer program- 
ing formulations that are suitable to compute this solution for 
arge scale applications, such as the Hungarian university admis- 
ion scheme with over 10 0,0 0 0 students. 
The presence of ties and equal treatment policy (i.e., not break- 
ng the ties) is also a feature in the Chilean university admissions 
 Rios, Larroucau, Parra, & Cominetti, 2014 ). However, the policy 
sed there is more permissive than the Hungarian one, since if 
wo students with the same score are competing for the last seat 
t a programme then they are both accepted in Chile, but both re- 
ected in Hungary, whilst a random tie-breaking is used in Ireland 
 Chen, 2012 ) to decide which student will be admitted. These so- 
ution concepts have been studied theoretically in Biró & Kiselgof 
2015) under the name of H-stability and L-stability. The intuitive 
esult proved in that paper is that when student-optimal stable so- 
utions are compared for the same instance then the cutoff scores 
re at least as high in Ireland as in Chile, and at least as high in
ungary as in Ireland. So the students are always getting the worst 
ssignments in Hungary, a better assignment in Ireland, and the 
est one in Chile. In this paper we quantify these differences on 
he Hungarian university admission instances from 2008 and 2009, 
resented in Section 5 . 
Common quotas are also present in many other applications. A 
ecent paper ( Baswana, Chakrabarti, Chandran, Kanoria, & Patange, 
019 ) describes the admission to Engineering Colleges in India, 
here common quotas are used for different, possibly overlapping 
ypes, just as in the Hungarian case. This means that a stable solu- 2 ion may not exist and the problem is NP-hard ( Biró et al., 2010 ),
hus the authors have proposed a heuristic algorithm. Interestingly 
he authors were aware of the possibility of using IP solutions for 
his problem, as described in Ágoston et al. (2016) for the Hun- 
arian case 2 , but they decided not to use that approach because 
f the possibly long run time. In this paper we demonstrate the 
ase of common quotas is tractable for large instances, even if the 
uotas are overlapping and the problem is further complicated by 
he presence of ties, as in the Hungarian case. The Indian appli- 
ations have also been studied by Sönmez & Yenmez (2019a,b) , 
here the case of nested set systems have been proved to be solv- 
ble by a generalised deferred-acceptance algorithm, which corre- 
ponds to the finding of Biró et al. (2010) on the Hungarian college 
dmissions. Furthermore, the same kind of requirements are im- 
lemented in college admission schemes with affirmative action, 
uch as the Brazilian college admission system ( Aygün & Bo, 2013 ). 
Similar distributional requirements are present for the Israeli 
echinot gap-year programs ( Gonczarowski, Kovalio, Nisan, & 
omm, 2019 ), where the authors developed and implemented 
 new Gale-Shapley type heuristic solution for the application. 
goston, Biró, & Szántó (2018b) used integer programming tech- 
iques for allocating students to companies at CEMS universities 
nder complex distributional constraints with respect to the types 
f students. Distributional constraints are present in school choice 
rogrammes as well, where the decision makers want to con- 
rol the socio-ethnical distribution of the students ( Abdulkadiro ̆glu, 
005; Abdulkadiro ̆glu & Ehlers, 2007; Bo, 2016; Echenique & Yen- 
ez, 2015; Ehlers, Hafalir, Yenmez, & Yildirim, 2014 ). Another 
ell-documented case is the Japanese resident allocation, where 
he government wants to ensure that the doctors are evenly dis- 
ributed across the country. They imposed lower quotas on the 
umber of doctors allocated in each region ( Goto, Kojima, Kurata, 
amura, & Yokoo, 2017; Kamada & Kojima, 2014; 2017a; 2017b ). 
Assignments problems are extensively studied in the OR liter- 
ture (see e.g. Pentico, 2007 ). There are many examples of prac- 
ical matching problems, such as papers assignment to review- 
rs ( Garg, Kavitha, Kumar, Mehlhorn, & Mestre, 2010 ), course al- 
ocation ( Diebold & Bichler, 2017 ), marriage assignment ( Cao, Frag- 
iére, Gautier, Sapin, & Widmer, 2010 ) and kidney exchanges ( Biró, 
an de Klundert, & Manlove, 2019 ). However, the usage of integer 
rogramming techniques is relatively new for two-sided match- 
ng markets under preferences. This may well be caused by the 
ood performance of the Gale-Shapley type heuristics in prac- 
ice (see e.g. Roth & Peranson, 1999 ). With their short run times, 
hey apparently have been preferred over integer programming ap- 
roaches to solve the sometimes large instances. Besides a previ- 
us paper ( Ágoston et al., 2016 ) motivated by the Hungarian uni- 
ersity admissions, there were only a couple of studies in this di- 
ection for finding maximum size weakly stable matchings in resi- 
ent allocation problem with ties ( Delorme et al., 2019; Kwanashie 
 Manlove, 2014 ), for finding stable matching in the presence of 
ouples ( Biró, McBride, & Manlove, 2014 ), and under distributional 
onstraints ( Ágoston et al., 2018b ). 
The paper most closely related to our work is the recent study 
f Delorme et al. (2019) , where IP techniques have been devel- 
ped and tested to solve a two-sided stable matching problem in 
 real application, pairing children with adoptive families. Our IP 
ormulations for solving the classical college admissions problem 
in their terminology, the Hospitals/Residents problem) are very 
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o  inary cutoff scores variables drastically improves the efficiency of 
he IP solution. Thereafter they focus on the NP-hard problem of 
nding a maximum size weakly stable matching in case of ties, 
hilst we investigate the Hungarian equal treatment policy when 
onsidering the ties and also the feature of common quotas, both 
resent in the Hungarian application. The presence of common 
uotas makes the problem NP-hard. We test our IP formulations on 
he 2008 and 2009 instances of Hungarian university admission. 
eal instances analysed 
Besides the 2008-Educatio instance, we have also had access 
o the Hungarian university admission data from another source, 
he KRTK Databank for the years 2001–2017. However the lat- 
er instances do not contain capacity constraints, and the identi- 
ers for the programmes also differ from the 2008-Educatio in- 
tance. Nevertheless, using the 2008-Education instance, we ex- 
ended our computational analyses for the 2009-KRTK instance un- 
er two reasonable assumptions after linking the 2008-Education 
nd 2008-KRTK instances and then the 2008-KRTK and 2009-KRTK 
nstances. 3 The linkage of the two 2008 instances involved match- 
ng of the students and programmes of the two instances. This 
as not straightforward due to some limitations of the instances 
e.g. the KRTK instance contained only the first six applications 
f each student) and the possibility that the two instances re- 
ect different snapshots of the applications. Nevertheless, approx- 
mately 98,5% of the programmes have been identified. Then we 
lso needed to match the programmes in the 20 08 and 20 09 KRTK 
nstances, which was also non-trivial due to the changes in the 
ist of programmes offered (sometimes only the name of the uni- 
ersity or the faculty has changed, but the programmes remained 
ssentially the same, which required manual checks). When the 
inkage between the programmes of the 2008-Educatio and 2009- 
RTK instances were ready, we added the capacity constraints for 
he 2009-KRTK instance in two reasonable ways: a) we used the 
ame constraints as in the 2008-Educatio instance, b) we used 
he number of admitted students in 2009 for all programmes and 
ommon quotas identified from the 2008-Educatio instance. We 
efer to these two cases as 2009-KRTK-previous and 2009-KRTK- 
dmitted, respectively. 
Regarding the main statistics of the instances, in the 2008- 
ducatio instance we have 81,427 applicants, 353,618 applications, 
298 programmes, 2275 faculty quotas, and 206 national common 
uotas. Whilst in the 2009-KRTK instance we have 105,739 appli- 
ants, 310,346 applications, 2992 programmes, 1828 faculty quotas, 
nd 197 national common quotas. 
ur contribution 
Our research is a follow-up of the work of Ágoston et al. (2016) ,
here the same application, the Hungarian university admission 
as studied with its four special features: ties, common quotas, 
ower quotas and paired applications. In Ágoston et al. (2016) the 
pecial features were considered one-by-one and their main result 
as a practically tractable IP solution for the NP-hard case of lower 
uotas, demonstrated on the 2008-Education instance. In this pa- 
er we continue the investigation and first we look more deeply 
nto the classical college admission problem, where we compare 
everal (mixed) IP formulations. The cutoff score formulation (al- 
eady described in Ágoston et al. (2016) ) turns out to be viable to
olve for the 2008-Educatio instance even without any preprocess- 
ng. For the still efficiently solvable case of ties we find that the 3 This data matching challenge was conducted as part of a student project, the 
etails are available in a BSc thesis upon request. 
t
a
3 ew binary cutoff formulation (that is similar to the IP suggested 
n Delorme et al. (2019) ) performs the best among the IP-s stud- 
ed. We then compare the solutions of the Hungarian, Irish and 
hilean policies for the case of ties. Confirming the theories de- 
cribed in Biró & Kiselgof (2015) , we find that indeed the student- 
ptimal cutoff scores are always the highest in Hungary, followed 
y the Irish cutoffs and the lowest in Chile, if considered for the 
ame instance. Finally, we define stability through cutoff scores 
or the case of ties and common quotas with respect to the Hun- 
arian and Chilean policies, and we propose IP formulations with 
inary cutoff score variables. We find that these IP formulations 
ork well for the 2008-Educatio instance. We compare the solu- 
ions with respect to the Hungarian, Irish and Chilean policies. We 
lso extended the computational analyses for the 2009-KRTK in- 
tance after linking the 2008-Education and 2008-KRTK instances 
s well as the 2008 and 2009 KRTK instances under two assump- 
ions: a) by using the 2008 quotas for 2009 everywhere, and b) 
etting the quotas equal to the number of students admitted. In 
rder to speed up the computations we introduced a preprocess- 
ng phase that fixes some variables in the IP model corresponding 
o students’ applications that are either surely accepted or surely 
ejected in the stable solutions. 
ayout of the paper 
In Section 2 , we start by investigating the basic Gale-Shapley 
ase and testing different IP formulations for a simplified instance 
f the 2008-Education instance. We find that the cutoff formula- 
ions perform better than the standard ones regarding their run 
ime. In Section 3 , we consider the special feature of ties under 
he Hungarian policy, where the quotas are strictly obeyed, so the 
ast group of students with the same score (that cannot fit in the 
uota) is rejected. Here we observe that the cutoff formulation 
ith binary variables outperforms the cutoff formulation with con- 
inuous variables. Then, in Section 4 , we describe IP formulations 
lso for the Chilean policy, where the last group of students is still 
ccepted (without whom there remains an empty seat, but with 
hom the quota may be violated). We compare the results ob- 
ained for the Hungarian, Irish and Chilean policies. Then we turn 
ur attention to common quotas, which are present in the Hun- 
arian application in a structure that make the problem NP-hard 
o solve ( Biró et al., 2010 ). We test different IP-s for solving the 
roblem under strict preferences in Section 5 . Finally, in Section 6 , 
e tackle the real case when both ties and common quotas are 
resent. We develop IP-s again for both the Hungarian and Chilean 
olicies and we compare the results for both the 2008-Educatio 
nd the 2009-KRTK instances. We conclude in Section 7 . 
. The Gale-Shapley model 
In this section we provide various IP formulations for the clas- 
ical Gale-Shapley college admission model and then we test these 
ormulations on the 2008-Educatio instance. 
.1. Definitions and preliminaries 
In the classical college admissions problem by Gale & Shapley 
1962) the students are assigned to colleges. 4 In the following we 
ill refer to the two sets as applicants A = { a 1 , . . . , a n } and colleges
 = { c 1 , . . . c m } . Throughout the manuscript, we use the convention
f i = 1 , . . . , n and j = 1 , . . . , m . Let u j denote the upper quota of4 In the computer science literature this problem setting is typically called Hospi- 
al/Residents problem (HR), due to the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) 
nd other related applications. 
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5 Note in Ágoston et al. (2016) 1 was used instead of ε, but we found that the 
latter choice makes the constraints tighter and the solution more efficient. ollege c j . Regarding the preferences, we assume that the appli- 
ants provide strict rankings over the colleges, where r i j denotes 
he rank of the application (a i , c j ) in applicant a i ’s preference list.
e suppose that the students are ranked according to their scores 
t the colleges, so college c j ranks applicant a i according to her 
core s i j at c j , where the greater the score the more preferred is 
he student by the college. Let E ⊆ A × C denote the set of appli- 
ations. A matching is a set of applications, where each student is 
dmitted to at most one college and each college has at most as 
any assignees as its quota. For a matching M let M(a i ) denote 
he college where a i is admitted to (or ∅ if a i is not allocated to
ny college) and let M(c j ) denote the set of applicants admitted to 
 j in M. Thus the feasibility of a matching M ⊂ E means that for ev- 
ry applicant a i , | M(a i ) | ≤ 1 and for every college c j , | M(c j ) | ≤ u j .
 matching M ⊂ E is stable if for any application (a i , c j ) outside M
ither a i prefers M(a i ) to c j or c j filled its seats with u j applicants
ho all have higher scores than a i has. The deferred-acceptance 
lgorithm of Gale and Shapley provides a student-optimal stable 
atching in linear time ( Gale & Shapley, 1962 ). 
The notion of cutoff scores is important for both the classical 
ale-Shapley model and its generalisations with ties and common 
uotas. Let t j denote the cutoff score of college c j and let t denote 
 set of cutoff scores for all colleges. A student a i is admissible to a
ollege c j with cutoff score t j if s i j ≥ t j . We say that matching M is
mplied by cutoff scores t if every student is admitted to the most 
referred college in her list, where she is admissible (i.e., achieved 
he cutoff score). We say that a set of cutoff scores t corresponds 
o a matching M if t implies M. For a matching M an applicant 
 i has justified envy towards another applicant a k at college c j if 
(a k ) = c j , a i prefers c j to M(a i ) and a i is ranked higher than a k at
 j (i.e. s i j > s k j ). A matching with no justified envy is called envy-
ree (see Wu & Roth, 2018 and Yokoi, 2020 ). 
It is not hard to see that a matching is envy-free if and only 
f it is implied by some cutoff scores ( Ágoston & Biró, 2017 ). Note
hat an envy-free matching can be wasteful in the sense that it 
an leave many desired seats empty (in fact the empty matching 
s also envy-free). More precisely, when a student a i prefers c j to 
(a i ) and c j is not saturated (i.e. | M(c j ) | < u j ) then we say that
is wasteful . By definition it follows that a matching is stable if 
nd only if it is envy-free and non-wasteful (see also Azevedo & 
eshno, 2016 ). To achieve non-wastefulness we can require the cut- 
ff of any unsaturated college to be minimum (zero in our case). 
lternatively, we may require that no cutoff score be decreased 
ithout violating the quota of that college, while keeping the other 
utoff scores. Furthermore, we may also satisfy the latter condition 
y ensuring that we select the student-optimal envy-free match- 
ng, which is the same as the student-optimal stable matching ( Wu 
 Roth, 2018 ). To obtain this solution we only need to use an ap-
ropriate objective function. We will use the above described con- 
ections when developing our IPs. 
.2. IP formulations 
Here we will describe three different formulations. 
he Baïou-Balinski formulation 
First we describe the basic IP formulation for the Gale-Shapley 
odel, proposed in Baïou & Balinski (20 0 0) . All of our formula-
ions are based on the binary variables corresponding to applica- 
ions, where x i j = 1 denotes that the application (a i , c j ) is accepted
n the solution (and x i j = 0 denotes that it is not). The feasibility
f a matching can be ensured with the following two sets of con- 
traints, which are part of all our IPs. ∑ 
j:(a i ,c j ) ∈ E 
x i j ≤ 1 for each a i ∈ A (1) 4 ∑ 
 :(a i ,c j ) ∈ E 
x i j ≤ u j for each c j ∈ C (2) 
Note that (1) implies that no applicant can be assigned to more 
han one college, whereas (2) implies that the upper quotas of the 
olleges are respected. 
To enforce the stability of a feasible matching we can use the 
ollowing constraint. 
 ∑ 
k : r ik ≤r i j 
x ik 
) 
· u j + 
∑ 
h :(a h ,c j ) ∈ E,s h j >s i j 
x h j ≥ u j for each (a i , c j ) ∈ E (3) 
Note that for each (a i , c j ) ∈ E, if a i is matched to c j or to a more
referred college then the first term ensures the satisfaction of the 
nequality. Otherwise, when the first term is zero, then the second 
erm is greater than or equal to the right hand side if and only if
he places at c j are filled with applicants with higher scores. 
Among the stable solutions we can choose the applicant- 
ptimal one by minimising the following objective function. 
in 
∑ 
(a i ,c j ) ∈ E 
r i j · x i j (4) 
We abbreviate this formulation based on constraints (1), (2) and 
3) , and objective function (4) as SO-BB (referring to student opti- 
al Baïou-Balinski model). This IP results in the student-optimal 
table matching. 
he cutoff score formulation 
For each college c j we define a nonnegative real variable t j de- 
oting its cutoff score. 
 j ≤
(
1 − x i j 
)
· ( ̄s + 1) + s i j for each (a i , c j ) ∈ E (5) 
nd 
 i j + ε ≤ t j + 
( ∑ 
k : r ik ≤r i j 
x ik 
) 
· ( ̄s + 1) for each (a i , c j ) ∈ E (6)
here s̄ is an upper bound for the scores (currently 500 in Hun- 
ary) and ε is a small positive number. 5 Here (5) implies that if a 
tudent a i is admitted to college c j then her score ( s i j ) has reached
he cutoff score. The second Eq. (6) ensures the envy-freeness, 
amely that if a i is not admitted to c j or to any better according to
er preference then it must be the case that she has not reached 
he cutoff at c j . Thus these two sets of conditions create the con- 
ection between the cutoff scores and the matching, ensuring that 
he matching implied by the cutoff scores is envy-free. 
To require stability of the matching we need to rule out the 
ossibility of blocking with an empty seat (i.e. wastefulness). This 
an be achieved by forcing the cutoff score of unsaturated colleges 
o be minimum (i.e. zero in our case) by the following constraints, 
here f j is a binary variable indicating whether c j rejects any stu- 
ent in the solution. 
f j · u j ≤
∑ 
(a i ,c j ) ∈ E: c j ∈ C 
x i j ∀ c j ∈ C (7) 
nd 
 j ≤ f j ( ̄s + 1) ∀ c j ∈ C (8) 
Our second IP is then constructed from feasibility constraints 
1), (2) , cutoff score constraints (5), (6) , non-wastefulness con- 
traints (7), (8) , and the objective function (4) enforcing student- 
ptimality. We abbreviate this IP as SO-NW-CUT, referring to 
tudent-optimal non-wasteful cutoff scores . 
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a1 2 3  As an alternative, we can drop the non-wastefulness constraints 
nd enforce stability directly by obtaining the student-optimal 




c j ∈ C 




(a i ,c j ) ∈ E 
(K − r i j ) · x i j (10) 
ith a large enough constant K. When combined with the feasi- 
ility constraints (1), (2) , and cutoff score constraints (5), (6) , we 
bbreviate the IP using objective function (9) as MIN-CUT, refer- 
ing to minimum cutoff scores . Likewise, when combined with the 
easibility constraints (1), (2) , and cutoff score constraints (5), (6) , 
e abbreviate the IP using objective function (10) as MSMR-CUT, 
eferring to maximum size minimum rank cutoff scores . Note that 
s explained earlier both MIN-CUT and MSMR-CUT will output the 
tudent-optimal stable matching. 
he binary cutoff score formulation 
We can make the cutoff formulations discrete by replacing the 
ontinuous cutoff variables by binary variables, as follows. For a 
ollege c j , let S j denote the set of scores the students have there,
.e. S j = { s i j : (a i , c j ) ∈ E} . Suppose also that the elements of S j are




. For each college c j , let us now introduce | S j | binary cutoff
ariables: t 1 
j 
, t 2 
j 
, . . . , t m 
j 
with the following constraints. 




j ≤ t k +1 j for each k = 1 . (| S j | − 1) (12) 
Here, t k 
j 




. Furthermore, (12) ensures the monotonicity of the binary cutoff
ariables and (11) requires that an application can only be accepted 
f the cutoff score is reached, corresponding to the continuous con- 
traint (5) . Regarding the second continuous constraint (6) we add 
he following simpler equations. 
 ≤
∑ 
h : r ih ≤r i j 
x ih + (1 − t k j ) for each (a i , c j ) ∈ E, s i j = s k j (13)
Therefore, constraints (11), (12) and (13) replace (5) and (6) , and 
ogether with the feasibility constraints (1), (2) they make the link 
etween the binary cutoff scores and the envy-free matchings. 
To achieve stability, we can use the same techniques as in the 
ontinuous case, with slightly modified conditions and objective 
unctions. 
As the first IP, instead of using Eqs. (7) and (8) , we can enforce
he cutoff score being zero for each unfilled college c j with the 
ollowing constraint. 
1 − t 1 j ) · u j ≤
∑ 
(a i ,c j ) ∈ E: c j ∈ C 
x i j ∀ c j ∈ C (14) 
The corresponding binary IP is then constructed from feasibility 
onstraints (1), (2) , cutoff score constraints (11), (12) and (13) , non- 
astefulness constraints (14) , and the objective function (4) that 
nforces student-optimality. We abbreviate this IP as SO-NW-BIN- 
UT, referring to student-optimal non-wasteful binary cutoff scores . 
Alternatively, we can drop again the non-wastefulness con- 
traints and enforce stability directly by obtaining the student- 




c j ∈ C,k =1 . | S j | 
t k j (15) 5 r objective function (10) . Combined with feasibility constraints 
1), (2) , and binary cutoff score constraints (11), (12) and (13) we 
btain two IPs, the MIN-BIN-CUT and MSMR-BIN-CUT, referring 
o minimum binary cutoff scores and maximum size minimum rank 
inary cutoff scores , both resulting in the student-optimal stable 
atching. 
nvy-free formulation 
It is also possible to enforce envy-freeness without using cutoff
cores, as explained in Ágoston & Biró (2017) , by using the follow- 
ng constraints. ∑ 
 : r ik ≤r i j 
x ik ≥ x h j ∀ (a i , c j ) , (a h , c j ) ∈ E, s i j ≥ s h j (16)
The above constraint means that if a student a h is allocated to 
ollege c j then every student a i , who has a score at c j at least as
igh as a h has, must also be allocated to c j or to a better college of
er preference. Combined with the feasibility constraints (1), (2) , 
nd objective function (10) the solution obtained is the student- 
ptimal stable matching. We abbreviate this formulation as MSMR- 
F, referring to maximum size minimum rank envy-free . 
ummary of formulations 
We summarise the constraints needed for all of the (mixed) IP 
ormulations that we tested for the basic Gale-Shapley college ad- 
ission model in Table 1 . 
.3. Computational results 
We took the 2008-Educatio instance after breaking the ties ran- 
omly, by considering only the faculty quotas and keeping only the 
ighest ranked application of each student for every programme 
i.e. the application for either the state funded or the privately 
unded seat). For the implementation we used AMPL with Gurobi. 
As we can see in Table 2 , the most efficient formulations used 
utoff scores. Even though SO-NW-CUT needed twice as many vari- 
bles as SO-BB, its runtime was smaller by a magnitude. Note that 
ery similar findings were reported in Delorme et al. (2019) . Com- 
aring the continuous and binary cutoff score formulations, SO- 
W-CUT and SO-NW-BIN-CUT, we can observe that the continuous 
ersion performed slightly better for this basic model. The simple 
SMR-EF formulation did not terminate, so we excluded this for- 
ulation from further consideration for the more general models. 
. Models with ties 
In many nationwide college admission programmes the stu- 
ents are ranked based on their scores, and ties may appear. In 
ungary, for instance, the students can obtain integer points be- 
ween 0 and 500 (the maximum was 144 until 2007), so ties do 
ccur. When ties are present then one way to resolve this issue is 
o break ties by lotteries, as done in Ireland (so a lucky student 
ith 480 point may be admitted to law school, whilst an unlucky 
tudent with the same score may be rejected). However, lotteries 
re often seen unfair, so in some countries, such as Hungary ( Biró
 Kiselgof, 2015 ) and Chile ( Rios et al., 2014 ) equal treatment poli-
ies are used, meaning that students with the same score are ei- 
her all accepted or all rejected. This policy gives way to two rea- 
onable variants when deciding about the last group of students 
ithout whom the quota is unfilled and with whom the quota is 
iolated. In the restrictive policy, used in Hungary, the quotas are 
ever violated, so this last group of students is always rejected, 
hilst in Chile they use a permissive policy and they always admit 
his last group of students. For instance, if there are three students, 
 , a and a , applying to a programme of quota 2 with scores 450,
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Table 1 
The summary of (mixed) integer programming formulations for the classical Gale-Shapley model. 
IP formulations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
SO-BB 
√ √ √ √ 
SO-NW-CUT 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
MIN-CUT 
√ √ √ √ √ 
MSMR-CUT 
√ √ √ √ √ 
SO-NW-BIN-CUT 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
MIN-BIN-CUT 
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
MSMR-BIN-CUT 
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
MSMR-EF 
√ √ √ √ 
Table 2 
The performance of (mixed) integer programming formulations for the classical Gale-Shapley 
model. 
IP formulations #variables #constraints #non-0 elem. size(Kb) run time(s) 
SO-BB 287,035 381,115 73,989,595 1,319,663 1139 
SO-NW-CUT 291,935 673,050 2,463,808 69,464 81 
MIN-CUT 289,485 668,150 2,169,423 64,254 5062 
MSMR-CUT 289,485 668,150 2,169,423 69,846 2318 
SO-NW-BIN-CUT 574,070 955,185 3,028,078 75,810 107 
MIN-BIN-CUT 574,070 952,735 2,738,593 65,657 871 
MSMR-BIN-CUT 574,070 952,735 2,738,593 66,467 4325 
































































 43, and 4 43, respectively then in Hungary only a 1 is admitted, 
hilst in Chile all three of them. In Ireland, a 1 is admitted and 
hey use a lottery to decide whether a 2 or a 3 will get the last seat.
.1. Definitions and preliminaries 
Stable matchings for the case of ties were defined through the 
utoff scores in Biró & Kiselgof (2015) . Using cutoff scores in case 
f ties makes the solution envy-free , meaning that no student a i 
ay be rejected from college c j if this college admitted another 
tudent with a score less than or equal to the score of student a i .
his allocation concept is also called equal treatment policy, since 
he admission of a student to a programme implies the admis- 
ion offer to all other students with the same score. 6 Here again, 
e have the same equivalence between envy-free matchings and 
atching induced by cutoff scores ( Ágoston & Biró, 2017 ), that we 
rove here for being self-contained. 
roposition 1. A matching is envy-free for a college admission prob- 
em with ties if and only if it is induced by cutoff scores. 
roof. Given an envy-free matching M let us set the cutoff score 
f each college to be the score of the weakest admitted student. 
hese cutoff scores will induce M. In the other direction, any 
atching induced by cutoff scores is obviously envy-free. 
In this paper we focus on the restrictive policy used in Hun- 
ary, where the stability of the matching can be defined by adding 
 non-wastefulness condition to envy-freeness. Namely, a matching 
nduced by cutoff scores is stable if no college can decrease its cut- 
ff score without violating its quota, assuming that the other cutoff
cores remain the same. We note that the stability of a matching 
an equivalently be defined by the lack of a set of blocking appli- 
ations involving one college and a set of applicants such that this 
et of applications would be accepted by all parties when com- 6 Note that it is also possible to define envy-freeness and stability in a weaker 
orm, where the rejection of a student is allowed when another student with the 
ame score is accepted. These so-called weakly stable or weakly envy-free matchings 
re used in the Scottish resident scheme ( Irving & Manlove, 2008 ), and in a project 







6 ared to the applications of the matching considered. See more 
bout this connection in Fleiner & Jankó (2014) . 7 
More formally, for a college c j and a set of applications X ⊂ E
o this college we define by Ch j (X ) ⊆ X the set of applications se- 
ected by c j . For the case of strict rankings the choice function is 
imple, if | X| ≤ u j then Ch j (X ) = X , and if | X| > u j when c j selects
he top u j applicants according to their scores. For ties we consider 
wo choice functions, Ch H 
j 
and Ch C 
j 
corresponding to the Hungarian 
estrictive and the Chilean permissive policies. First we note that 
or | X| ≤ u j we have Ch H j (X ) = Ch C j (X ) = X , the question is what
appens for | X| > u j . For cutoff score t j let X ≥t j denote the sub- 
et of applications in X where the students have score t j or higher 
t c j . In the Hungarian policy Ch 
H 
j 
(X ) = X ≥t j such that | X ≥t j | ≤ u j 
nd | X ≥t j −1 | > u j , thus the number of students selected is never
ore than the quota, but the cutoff is minimal, i.e., decreasing 
he cutoff would imply the violation of the quota. In the Chilean 
olicy Ch C 
j 
(X ) = X ≥t j such that | X ≥t j | ≥ u j and | X ≥t j +1 | < u j , thus
he number of students selected is at least as much as the quota, 
ut the cutoff is maximal, i.e., increasing the cutoff would imply to 
ave empty seats. 
Biró & Kiselgof (2015) proved two main theorems about stable 
atchings for college admissions with ties. In their first theorem 
hey showed that a student-optimal and a student-pessimal sta- 
le matching exist for both the restrictive policy (Hungary) and 
he permissive policy (Chile), where the cutoff scores are mini- 
al / maximal, thus the matchings are the best / worst for all 
tudents, respectively. Furthermore, they also proved the intuitive 
esults that if we compare the student-optimal cutoff scores (or 
he student-pessimal ones) with respect to the three reasonable 
olicies, namely the Hungarian (restrictive), the Irish (lottery), and 
he Chilean (permissive), then the Hungarian cutoff scores are al- 
ays as high for each college as the Chilean cutoff scores and the 
rish cutoff scores are in between. When considering the student- 7 There are many interesting properties that apply differently for the three poli- 
ies, as demonstrated in Fleiner & Jankó (2014) and Biró & Kiselgof (2015) . For in- 
tance, the corresponding choice functions are substitutable for all the three policies, 
ut the irrelevance of rejected contracts property is violated for the Hungarian pol- 
cy, and the law of aggregate demand property is violated for both the Hungarian 
nd Chilean policies. That is why neither of the latter two policies is strategyproof 
or the students, even though student-optimal solutions do exist. 
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ptimal stable matching, it turns out to be also the student- 
ptimal envy-free matching, as the following proposition describes 
n Ágoston & Biró (2017) . 
roposition 2. For the college admission problem with ties the 
tudent-optimal stable matching is also student-optimal among the 
nvy-free matchings with respect to the Hungarian (or Chilean) equal 
reatment policy. 
roof. Assume by way of contradiction that there is an envy-free 
atching M, where one student gets a better assignment than in 
he student-optimal stable matching M s . Without loss of generality 
e may also assume that M is not Pareto-dominated by another 
nvy-free matching M ′ with the same property (i.e., where every 
tudent would get at least as good an assignment and somebody 
ould get a strictly better assignment). By Proposition 1 we know 
hat M is induced by some cutoff score t . Note that M cannot be 
table, since that would contradict to the student-optimality of M s . 
herefore there is at least one college where the cutoff score can 
e decreased so that new students will be admitted there, but its 
uota is not violated. Let the new cutoff score be t ′ and let the 
ew matching implied be M ′ . But then M ′ is also envy-free and 
areto-dominates M, a contradiction. 
.2. IP formulations 
First we describe which of the (M)IP formulations for the clas- 
ical model work unchanged for the case of ties, and then we give 
ome alternative formulations. 
revious IP-s that work for ties 
For the restrictive (Hungarian) equal treatment policy we have 
o keep the original feasibility constraints (1), (2) . Constraints 
16) ensure envy-freeness immediately, and we can also achieve 
nvy-freeness by using the same constraints with cutoff scores ( (5), 
6) ), or with binary cutoff scores ( (11), (12) and (13) ). 
To secure stability, we can enforce the selection of the stu- 
ent optimal envy-free matching by using an appropriate objective 
unction, as implied by Proposition 2 . Essentially all the student- 
ptimal IP formulations for envy-free matchings that were previ- 
usly described for the Gale-Shapley model will lead to this solu- 
ion, namely MIN-CUT, MSMR-CUT, MIN-BIN-CUT, MSMR-BIN-CUT 
nd MSMR-EF (however, we leave out the latter from the simula- 
ions due to its bad performance for the basic model). 
lternative formulations 
When we want to avoid the inclusion of objective functions, we 
ay also enforce stability directly by adding new variables d i j and 
onstraints, as described in Ágoston et al. (2016) . Here d i j is a bi-
ary variable showing whether a i would be admitted to c j if the 
utoff score decreased at c j by one. 
 ik ≤ (1 − x i j ) for each (a i , c j ) ∈ E, (a i , c k ) ∈ E, r ik ≥ r i j (17)
Condition (17) implies that d i j can only be one if student a i 
refers c j to her current assignment. 
 j − 1 ≤
(
1 − d i j 
)
· ( ̄s + 1) + s i j for each (a i , c j ) ∈ E (18)
here (18) is a modification of (5) , implying that d i j can only be
ne if a i reaches the cutoff score, when decreased by one. 
Now, with these new variables we can also formulate the non- 
astefulness condition, where f j will again indicate whether c j is 
ssentially full, meaning that its cutoff score cannot be decreased 
ithout violating its quota. Besides keeping (8) , we modify (7) into 
he following condition. 
f j · (u j + 1) ≤
∑ 
(a i ,c j ) ∈ E: c j ∈ C 
(x i j + d i j ) ∀ c j ∈ C (19) 7 To summarise, together with the basic feasibility conditions (1), 
2) , and cutoff score constraints (5), (6) , satisfaction of Eqs. (17) , 
18), (8), (19) result in a stable matching with respect to the Hun- 
arian equal treatment policy. To find the student-optimal stable 
atching in this context, we may again use objective function (10) . 
e denote this formulation by SO-H-NW-CUT. 
inary cutoffs 
Finally, we can again use binary variables for the cutoffs. Keep- 
ng the feasibility constraints (1), (2) , cutoff score constraints (11), 
12) and (13) , we modify the non-wastefulness constraints (14) as 
ollows. 
1 − t 1 j ) · (u j + 1) ≤
∑ 
(a i ,c j ) ∈ E: c j ∈ C 
x i j + d i j ∀ c j ∈ C (20)
We keep (17) and modify (18) to the following constraints. 
 i j ≤ t k +1 i − t k i for each (a i , c j ) ∈ E, s i j = s k j (21) 
These constraints mean that if d i j = 1 then the score of the ap-
licant is just below of the cutoff score. Using objective function 
10) , with feasibility constraints (1), (2) , cutoff score constraints 
11), (12) and (13) , non-wastefulness constraints (17), (20) and (21) , 
e get the formulation denoted by SO-H-NW-BIN-CUT. 
.3. Simulations 
We considered the 2008-Education instance with ties by taking 
nto account only the faculty quotas and keeping only the highest 
anked application of each student for every programme (i.e. the 
pplication for either a state funded or privately funded seat). The 
esults are summarised in Table 3 . We can observe that the best 
inary IP formulation has outperformed the best continuous for- 
ulation. 
. Policy comparison for ties 
First we set up an IP formulation for the Chilean policy, and 
hen we compare the solutions obtained by the Hungarian, Irish 
nd Chilean policies in the 2008-Educatio instance. 
.1. IP for the Chilean policy 
Recall that here we admit the last group of students, with 
hom the quota is violated, but without whom some seats re- 
ain unfilled. Alternatively, we may require that after decreasing 
he cutoff score at any college the number of admitted students 
ould be strictly less than its quota. To achieve this in the most 
ffective way, we use a similar formulation as SO-H-NW-CUT for 
he Hungarian policy. 
he cutoff score formulation 
Here d i j is a binary variable showing that a i is admitted to c j , 
ut would be rejected if the cutoff score increased at c j by one. 
 i j ≤ x i j for each (a i , c j ) ∈ E (22) 
Conditions (22) imply that d i j can only be one if student a i is 
dmitted to c j in the actual matching. 
d i j − 1 
)
· ( ̄s + 1) + s i j ≤ t j for each (a i , c j ) ∈ E (23) 
here (23) implies that d i j will only be one if a i is rejected if the 
utoff increases by one. 
Now, with these variables we can also formulate the non- 
astefulness condition, where f j will again indicates whether c j 
s essentially full, meaning that there would be empty seats if 
K.C. Ágoston, P. Biró, E. Kováts et al. European Journal of Operational Research xxx (xxxx) xxx 
ARTICLE IN PRESS 
JID: EOR [m5G; September 11, 2021;17:1 ] 
Table 3 
The performances of (mixed) integer programming formulations for the case of ties. 
IP formulations #variables #constraints #non-0 elem. size(Mb) run time(s) 
MIN-CUT 289,485 668,150 2,169,423 59,694 5247 
MSMR-CUT 289,485 668,150 2,169,423 65,286 1460 
MIN-BIN-CUT 428,513 807,178 2,447,479 53,548 982 
MSMR-BIN-CUT 428,513 807,178 2,447,479 57,106 1362 
SO-H-NW-CUT 578,970 1,694,333 4,793,409 114,882 1310 
SO-H-NW-BIN-CUT 861,105 1,813,840 5,352,772 118,828 165 
Table 4 
The comparison of student-optimal (A-opt) and student-pessimal (C-opt) stable matchings for the case 
of ties under the Hungarian, Irish and Chilean policies. 
size of matching average rank average cutoffs # rejections 
policies A-opt. C-opt. A-opt. C-opt. A-opt. C-opt. A-opt. C-opt. 
Hungarian 86,195 86,195 1.2979 1.2979 58.3931 58.3931 37,698 37,698 
Irish 86,410 86,410 1.2916 1.2916 58.2090 58.2106 36,802 36,804 












































































he cutoff score increased by one. Besides keeping (7) and (8) , we 
odify (2) into the following sets of constraints. ∑ 
a i ,c j ) ∈ E: c j ∈ C 
(x i j − d i j ) ≤ u j − 1 ∀ c j ∈ C (24) 
In summary, together with the basic applicant-feasibility con- 
itions (1) and cutoff score constraints (5), (6) , satisfaction of Eqs. 
7) , (8), (22), (23), (24) result in a stable matching with respect 
o the Chilean equal treatment policy. To find the student-optimal 
table matching in this context, we may again use objective func- 
ion (10) . Denote this formulation by SO-C-NW-CUT. 
inary cutoffs 
As follows we also describe the alternative IP formulation with 
inary cutoff variables, abbreviated as SO-C-NW-BIN-CUT. 
We keep feasibility conditions (1) and (24) , as in the SO-C-NW- 
UT model, and we also impose (22) . Furthermore, we have cutoff
core constraints (11), (12) and (13) , just like in SO-NW-BIN-CUT 
nd SO-H-NW-BIN-CUT. However, (23) will be now replaced with 
he following set of conditions. 
 i j ≤ t k i − t k −1 i for each (a i , c j ) ∈ E, s i j = s k j (25) 
These conditions ensure that d i j can only be one if s i j is equal 
o the current cutoff score. 
.2. Computational results 
We conducted the simulation on the 2008-Educatio instance, 
here we compared the results for the Hungarian, Irish and 
hilean policies, as summarised in Table 4 . For the student- 
essimal solutions, we minimised the objective function of (10) . 
he results indeed follow the theorems of Biró & Kiselgof 
2015) regarding the cutoff scores for the three different policies. 
he improvements from the Hungarian to the Irish and from the 
rish to the Chilean matchings are significant for the students. An- 
ther interesting fact of the simulation is that for the Hungar- 
an and Chilean policies we observed no difference between the 
tudent-optimal and student pessimal solutions, so the stable so- 
utions are unique for both cases. Regarding the Irish policy the 
ifference between the student-optimal and student-pessimal so- 
utions is minor. These findings are in line with previous results 
n large markets, such as the case of NRMP described in Roth & 
eranson (1999) . 
. Models with common quotas 
Here we consider the case of common quotas for strict rankings 
rst. 8 .1. Definitions and preliminaries 
In the Hungarian university admission scheme the students can 
pply for so-called studies , where the study programme and the as- 
ociated financial contract are both specified. The contract can be 
ither state-funded, where the students can study free of charge 
but under some strict conditions over the length of the study and 
heir future employment in Hungary), or it can be a privately fi- 
anced contract, where the students pay a tuition. For each pro- 
ramme, there is a common faculty quota for the number of ad- 
itted students irrespective of their contract terms, and there is 
lso a nationwide quota for the number of students in each subject 
rea that can be admitted to any programme with state-fund. For 
nstance, the government may decide that they cover the studies 
f 30 0 0 computer science students in Hungary, whilst BME (Bu- 
apest University of Technology and Economics) can have a faculty 
uota of 500 for CS students, implying for both state funded and 
rivately funded contracts together. 
The rejection of a student a i to a state-funded study c j is con- 
idered fair, if either the faculty quota is filled with higher ranked 
tudents applying for the programme of c j , or the nationwide 
uota for the subject of c j is filled with higher ranked students. Re- 
arding the applications to privately-funded studies, only the bind- 
ng faculty quotas can result in rejections. 
This feature of the Hungarian application scheme motivated the 
tudy of the college admission problem with common quotas, de- 
ned and studied first in Biró et al. (2010) . In this model, for each 
et of colleges C p ⊆ C, there may be an upper quota u p for the
umber of applications accepted by colleges belonging to C p . Let C 
c 
enote the sets of colleges that have common upper quotas (which 
lso includes every individual college, since they also have upper 
uotas). A matching is feasible if no common upper quota is vi- 
lated. A feasible matching is stable if for each rejected applica- 
ion by applicant a i to college c j there exists at least one common 
uota for a set of colleges C p , such that c j ∈ C p and C p is filled with
pplicants ranked higher than a i . In this definition we must also 
ssume that a set of colleges C j with common quota has a mas- 
er ranking over the students applying to any college in that set. 
herefore, considering the scores of the applicants, if two colleges 
 j and c h both belong to a common set C p then the score of an
pplicant must be the same at both c j and c h , so essentially the 
tudents have scores for the sets of colleges with common quotas. 
For a set of colleges C p we can also define the choice func- 
ion over a set of applications X ⊂ E, that we denote by Ch p for
trict rankings, and Ch H p and Ch 
C 
p for ties under the Hungarian and 
hilean policies, respectively. We suppose that X contains only the 
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est application of each student (if not then we remove all but 
he most preferred one by the student). Again, we define X ≥t p 
s the set of applications with score at least t p , where t p is the
utoff score for common quota C p . Just as for single colleges, the 
hoice function selects here the best feasible set of applications 
rom X , where feasibility is defined according to the Hungarian 
nd the Chilean policies in an analogous way as for single col- 
eges. Thus if | X| > u p then for the Hungarian policy Ch H p (X ) = X ≥t p 
uch that | X ≥t p | ≤ u p and | X ≥t j −1 | > u p , and in the Chilean policy
h C p (X ) = X ≥t p such that | X ≥t p | ≥ u p and | X ≥t p +1 | < u p . 
An alternative definition of stability can be given by introducing 
utoff scores for sets of colleges with common quotas. The corre- 
pondence between the envy-free matchings and cutoff scores are 
imilar as in the basic model, every student is admitted to the best 
ollege according to her preference, where she achieved the cutoff
core for every set of colleges with common quota including this 
ollege. Non-wastefulness can also be described in a similar way 
s before, no set of colleges with common quota can decrease its 
utoff score without violating its common quota. 
Biró et al. (2010) showed that a stable matching may not exist 
n this model 8 , and the problem to decide the existence is NP-hard, 
ven in the special case of the Hungarian university admission sys- 
em introduced in 2007. However, they also showed that if the set 
ystem is nested (also called laminar or hierarchic in the literature), 
hat is if for every pair of sets C p , C q ⊆ C either C p ⊆ C q or C q ⊆ C p ,
hen a stable matching always exists and can be computed effi- 
iently. This was the case until 2007 in the Hungarian university 
dmission. 
Ágoston et al. (2016) gave an IP formulation for the problem, 
ut they were not able to solve the problem on the 2008-Educatio 
nstance. Below, we will give a slightly modified IP formulation 
ith binary cutoff scores, and demonstrate its applicability for the 
008-Educatio and 2009-KRTK instances, and in addition we fur- 
her generalise the IP formulations for the case when both ties and 
ommon quotas are present. 
.2. IP formulations 
First we recall the IP formulation suggested in Ágoston et al. 
2016) and then extend it to binary variables. For all formulations 
n order to take into account the common upper quotas we need 
he following set of feasibility constraints 
∑ 
a i ,c j ) ∈ E;c j ∈ C p 
x i j ≤ u p ∀ C p ⊆ C (26) 
utoff formulation for common quotas 
Introduce a continuous cutoff variable t p for each common 
uota C p . As before, we ensure that an applicant a i is admissible 
o a college c j belonging to C p if she achieved the cutoff score t p 
or every set of colleges C p college c j belongs to. That is, conditions 
5) change as follows. 
 p ≤
(
1 − x i j 
)
· ( ̄s + 1) + s i j for each (a i , c j ) ∈ E, c j ∈ C p (27)8 For clarity we give their example here. Assume there are applicants, a 1 , a 2 and 
 3 , and four colleges c 1 , c 2 , c 3 and c 4 , where c 1 and c 2 have a common quota of 1 
nd c 2 , c 3 have a common quota of 1, whilst c 4 has a simple upper quota of 1. For 
olleges c 1 , c 2 and c 3 , the ranking order is a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , while for c 4 it is the opposite. 
inally, a 1 has the preference list c 4 , c 1 , a 2 only applies to c 2 , and a 3 has prefer- 
nce list c 3 , c 4 . One can easily check that none of the possible matchings is stable, 
s { (a 1 , c 1 ) , (a 3 , c 3 ) } is blocked by (a 1 , c 4 ) , { (a 1 , c 4 ) , (a 3 , c 3 ) } is blocked by (a 2 , c 2 ) , 
 (a 1 , c 4 ) , (a 2 , c 2 ) } is blocked by (a 3 , c 4 ) , { (a 2 , c 2 ) , (a 3 , c 4 ) } is blocked by (a 1 , c 1 ) , and 






9 To ensure envy-freeness the following sets of constraints are in- 
roduced. 
 i j + ε ≤ t p + 
( ∑ 
k : r ik ≤r i j 
x ik + (1 − b p j ) 
) 





is a binary variable for each pair of college c j and com-
on quota C p such that c j ∈ C p . Finally, we require that ∑ 
p: c j ∈ C p 
b p 
j 
≥ 1 , ∀ c j ∈ C. (29) 
The latter two sets of conditions imply that, if the application 
a i , c j ) is rejected, then there must be at least one common quota
or set C p such that c j ∈ C p and the cutoff score at C p is higher than
he score of a i there. 
For stability, besides envy-freeness we also need to provide 
on-wastefulness. This can be reached by enforcing the cutoff
cores for sets of colleges to be zero if the quota is not fully filled.
his can be implemented with the following sets of constraints, 
here f p is a binary variable for every set of colleges C p with com-
on quota. 
f p · u p ≤
∑ 
(a i ,c j ) ∈ E: c j ∈ C p 
x i j ∀ C p ∈ C c (30) 
nd 
 p ≤ f p ( ̄s + 1) ∀ C p ∈ C c (31) 
To summarise, besides the feasibility conditions (1) and (26) , 
he stability is achieved by conditions (27), (28), (29), (30) and 
31) . Together with objective function (10) we abbreviate this IP 
s COM-SO-CUT. 
inary cutoffs for common quotas 
Instead of the continuous variables t p for the cutoff of C p now 
e introduce binary variables. The corresponding constraints (11), 
12) and (13) will be generalised for the case of common quotas as 
ollows. 
For a set of colleges C p , let S p denote the set of scores the
tudents have, i.e. S p = { s i j : (a i , c j ) ∈ E, c j ∈ C p } . Suppose also that
he elements of S p are sorted in an increasing order, so S p = 
 s 1 p , s 
2 
p , . . . , s 
m 
p } , where s k p < s k +1 p . For each set of colleges C p with a
ommon quota, introduce | S p | binary cutoff variables: t 1 p , t 2 p , . . . , t m p 
ith the following constraints. 




p ≤ t k +1 p for each k = 1 . (| S p | − 1) , C p ∈ C c (33)
Here again, t k p = 0 means that the cutoff score at C p is greater 
han s k p . Furthermore, (33) ensures the monotonicity of the binary 
utoff variables and (32) ensures that an application (a i , c j ) can 
nly be accepted if the cutoff score is met for each set of colleges 




h : r ih ≤r i j 
x ih + 
∑ 
p: c j ∈ C p ,s i j = s k p 
(1 − t k p ) for each (a i , c j ) ∈ E, c j ∈ C p 
(34) 
The latter set of constraints imply that if a i is rejected from c j 
i.e., when the first term of the right hand side is zero), then there 
ust be at least one set of colleges C p such that t 
k 
p is zero, where
 i j = s k p , meaning that a i has not reached the cutoff score at C p , so
er rejection is fair. 
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For stability, we also have to ensure non-wastefulness, which 
an be achieved with constraints similar to (14) used in SO-NW- 
IN-CUT, as follows. 
1 − t 1 p ) · u p ≤
∑ 
(a i ,c j ) ∈ E: c j ∈ C p 
x i j ∀ C p ∈ C c (35) 
To summarise, the binary formulation is composed of feasibility 
onditions (1) and (26) and stability conditions (32), (33), (34) and 
35) with (10) as objective function. For simplicity, denote this 
P formulation by COM-Irish, since the further characteristics, de- 
oted by SO-NW-BIN-CUT, will be shared in all of the IP models 
hat we will consider for the case of ties and common quotas in 
he next section. 
This problem variant represents the situation where the ties in 
he rankings are broken by lottery (as done in Ireland). However, 
n Hungary and Chile the ties are not broken, which motivates the 
ext, most general setting, where both ties and common quotas 
re present. 
. Models with ties and common quotas 
We learned in our simulations for the case of common quotas 
ith no ties that the best performing IPs are the ones with binary 
utoff scores (the IP with continuous variables did not terminate 
n a reasonable time), therefore, we will only use the latter IP for- 
ulation in this section. 
When ties and common quotas are both present in the appli- 
ation then it is unclear what would be the most suitable stabil- 
ty definitions. First of all, we have to differentiate between the 
ore restrictive approach used in Hungary and the more permis- 
ive method used in Chile, in case of ties with no common quotas. 
e will also try to ensure that in case of no ties both concepts are
quivalent with the model described in the previous section. 
.1. Definitions and preliminaries 
We will define the desired solution with cutoff scores, as this 
rovides envy-freeness automatically. The cutoffs are defined for 
he common quotas, and an application to college c j may be ac- 
epted if the cutoff score is met for every set of colleges C p with 
ommon quota college c j belongs to. The question is how to define 
on-wastefulness. By generalising the concepts for the case of ties 
with no common quotas) define a solution to be non-wasteful for 
he Hungarian policy if no cutoff score can be decreased without 
iolating the corresponding common quota. Regarding the Chilean 
olicy, it is required that common quotas are violated only by the 
ast group of students with the same score. This is equivalent to 
he assumption that after increasing any cutoff score of a set of 
olleges C p with common quota, the number of students admitted 
o C p would be strictly less than its common quota. We can see 
hat both the Hungarian and the Chilean definition are equivalent 
o the previous stable matching definition for common quotas if no 
ies occur. 
Since we have seen that the binary cutoff formulations outper- 
ormed the continuous formulations, it is enough to consider bi- 
ary formulations for the Hungarian and Chilean policies here. 
.2. Binary IP formulations for the Hungarian policy 
Just as in the previous section, we have binary cutoff variables 
 t 1 p , t 
2 
p , . . . , t 
m 
p } for each set of colleges C p . The feasibility of the so-
ution is satisfied due to conditions (26) . Also, we can establish the 
orrespondence between the cutoff scores and the matching by the 
ame conditions as before, i.e. with (32), (33) and (34) . 




for each applicant a i and set of colleges C p ∈ C c , that have value 10 ne if a i is not yet admitted to a college in C p , but after decreasing
he cutoff at C p by one step (i.e. to the subsequent score group), 
 i would be admitted to a college in C p . For the precise formula-
ions, for each application by a i to c j , where c j ∈ C p , we also need
o introduce a binary variable e 
p 
i j 
, which can have value one, if a i 
s neither admitted to c j nor to a preferred place, but she would 
e admitted to c j if the cutoff at C p decreased by one. 
Non-wastefulness in this model means that no cutoff score can 
e decreased without violating a common quota. Instead of (17) , 




≤ (1 − x i j ) for each (a i , c j ) ∈ E, (a i , c k ) ∈ E, c k ∈ C p , r ik ≥ r i
(36) 
This implies that e 
p 
ik 
can only be one if a i is not admitted to c k 









≤ t k q for each (a i , c j ) ∈ E, c j ∈ C q , p  = q, s i j = s k q (38)
These two sets of constraints imply that e 
p 
i j 
can only be one if a i 
s not admitted to c j , but she would be admitted to c j if the cutoff
t C p decreased by one, since she also meets the cutoffs of every 












j: c j ∈ C p 
e p 
i j 
for each (a i , c j ) ∈ E, c j ∈ C p ∈ C c (39)
The latter conditions make sure that d 
p 
i 
can only be one if there 
xists some college c j , where a i would be admitted if the cutoff of 
 p decreased by one. Finally, just as in (20) , we require the follow- 
ng constraints by setting x 
p 
i 
= ∑ (a i ,c j ) ∈ E: c j ∈ C p x i j . 
1 − t 1 p ) · (u p + 1) ≤
∑ 
a i ∈ A 
x p 
i 
+ d p 
i 
for each C p ∈ C c (40) 
These constraints are in line with our definition of non- 
astefulness, by ensuring that no cutoff score of a set of colleges 
 p can be decreased, since otherwise the common quota of C p 
ould be violated. 
To summarise, the IP formulation for the Hungarian variant for 
he most general case of ties and common quotas, denoted by 
OM-Hungarian, consists of feasibility conditions (1) and (26) and 
tability conditions (32), (33), (34), (36), (37), (38), (39) and 
40) with (10) as objective function. 
.3. Binary IP formulations for the Chilean policy 
The IP formulation for the Chilean policy is similar to the Hun- 




, only those of type d 
p 
i . This is so because d 
p 
i can be one
f a i is admitted to a college in C p and she just met the cutoff, so
he would be rejected if the cutoff of C p decreased. The common 
uotas may be violated, but only with the last score group admit- 
ed. Without them some seats would remain empty in the colleges 
elonging to the common quota. 
To summarise, there are binary cutoff variables { t 1 p , t 2 p , . . . , t m p }
or each set of colleges C p , and for each applicant a i and common
uota C p there is a binary variable d 
p 
i if a i is applying to any col- 
ege in C p . The correspondence between the cutoff scores and the 
atching is established by conditions (32), (33) and (34) . The fea- 
ibility of the solution is ensured with a condition similar to (24) , 
s follows ∑ 
 :(a i ,c j ) ∈ E,c j ∈ C p 
(x p 
i 
− d p i ) ≤ u p − 1 for each C p ∈ C c (41) 
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Table 5 
The performance of the binary cutoff formulations for the case of ties and common quotas under 
the Hungarian, Irish and Chilean policies. 
IP formulations #variables #constraints #non-0 elem. size(Kb) run time(s) 
COM-Hungarian 1,566,052 3,311,220 11,423,605 191,222,474 158,949.17 
COM-Irish 804,576 1,490,331 5,360,107 121,110,852 22,320.28 
COM-Chilean 1,114,913 2,389,382 8,331,816 192,978,328 52,962.27 
Table 6 
The comparison of student-optimal (A-opt) and student-pessimal (C-opt) stable 
matchings for the case of ties and common quotas under the Hungarian, Irish 
and Chilean policies for the 2008-Educatio instance. 
size of matching average rank # rejections 
policies A-opt. C-opt. A-opt. C-opt. A-opt. C-opt. 
Hungarian 81,581 81,427 1.6496 1.6534 81,369 82,043 
Irish 81,825 81,825 1.6413 1.6414 80,237 80,239 




































































10 To give an intuition for the latter result, we give a simple example, where the 
same phenomenon can be observed. Let us have three students, s 1 , s 2 and s 3 with 
scores 1010 and 9 respectively, and two colleges A and B with individual quota 1 for 
each, and also with a common quota of 1 for both A and B . Suppose that s 1 and s 2 
are applying to A and s 3 is applying to B . For the Irish policy, we run a lottery, and 
whichever student between s 1 and s 2 is luckier gets admitted to A and both of the 
other students are both rejected. This is the unique stable solution. For the Chilean These conditions allow the common quotas to be violated, but 
nly for the last score group admitted. Without them the number 
f students admitted is strictly less than the common quota. For d 
p 
i 
e have a condition similar to (22) : 
 
p 
i ≤ x p i for each a i ∈ A, C p ∈ C c s.t. ∃ c j : (a i , c j ) ∈ E, c j ∈ C p 
(42) 
Conditions (42) imply that d 
p 
i can only be one if student a i 
s admitted to a college c j belonging to common quota C p in the 




i ≤ t k p − t k −1 p for each (a i , c j ) ∈ E, c j ∈ C p , s i j = s k p (43)
These conditions imply that d 
p 
i can only be one if the score of 
 i is equal to the current cutoff score at C p . 
To summarise, the IP formulation for the Chilean variant for the 
ost general case of ties and common quotas, denoted by COM- 
hilean, is composed of feasibility conditions (1) and (26) and sta- 
ility conditions (32), (33), (34), (41), (42) and (43) with (10) as 
bjective function. 
.4. Computational results for the 2008-Educatio instance 
We compared the three above described IP formulations first 
or the 2008-Educatio instance, where the ties and common quotas 
ere included in the data in their actual form. The performance of 
he three formulations are summarised in Table 5 . Although the 
olver needed about a whole day to terminate 9 , the IP was solved 
or the Hungarian case as well. 
The final student-optimal and student-pessimal solutions are 
hown in Table 6 , where the former solutions used (10) as objec- 
ive function and the latter used the same with minimisation (in- 
tead of maximisation). Similarly to the case of ties, it can be ob- 
erved that there were significant differences between the results 
cross the three policies, the Hungarian providing the highest cut- 
ff scores (and the worst assignments for the students), followed 
y the Irish policy, and the Chilean turned out to be the most 
avourable for the students, as expected. Also, we can see that the 
ifferences between the student-optimal and student-pessimal so- 9 We used a normal PC with the following parameters: Intel Core i3-8100 CPU, 








11 utions are minor (if any) for the Irish and Chilean policies, but a 
ittle more significant for the Hungarian policy. 10 
.5. Improvement by preprocessing 
When solving the 2009-KRTK instances we experienced even 
onger computation times than for the 2008-Educatio instance, so 
e looked for possibilities for fixing some of the variables. The 
ew preprocessing algorithm was based on the following Lemmas. 
n the first one we gave a natural condition for the certain accept- 
ble of a first application. 
emma 3. Suppose that (a i , c j ) is the first application of student a i .
or the Hungarian policy, if this application is selected with respect to 
ach relevant common quota from all the applications, i.e., if (a i , c j ) ∈
h H p (E) for each common quota C p , where c j ∈ C p , then (a i , c j ) is a
art of all stable solutions with respect to this policy. Likewise, for the 
hilean policy, if (a i , c j ) ∈ Ch C p (E) for each common quota C p , where
 j ∈ C p , then (a i , c j ) is contained in all stable solutions with respect
o this policy. 
roof. Consider the Hungarian policy first, with choice function 
h H p for each common quota C p , where c j ∈ C p . According to our
ssumption we have (a i , c j ) ∈ Ch H p (E) for every C p , where c j ∈ C p .
uppose on the contrary that a stable solution would not include 
a i , c j ) . It must then be the case that cutoff score t p is greater than
 i j for some common quota C p , where c j ∈ C p . However, this con-
radicts the minimality of the cutoff scores of a stable solution 
ince t p can be decreased to s i j because even for E , | E ≥s i j | ≤ u p 
ccording to our assumption. The proof for the Chilean policy is 
nalogous. 
In the next lemma we give a condition for rejecting an applica- 
ion. 
emma 4. Let F j denote the set of first applications submitted to col- 
ege c j . For an application (a i , c j ) , let X = F j ∪ { (a i , c j ) } . If (a i , c j ) / ∈
h H p (X ) for some C p , where c j ∈ C p , then (a i , c j ) cannot be included
n any stable solution with respect to the Hungarian policy. Likewise, 
f (a i , c j ) / ∈ Ch C p (X ) for some C p , where c j ∈ C p , then (a i , c j ) cannot be
ncluded in any stable solution with respect to the Chilean policy. 
roof. Considering the Hungarian policy first, suppose for a con- 
radiction that (a i , c j ) / ∈ Ch H p (X ) for some C p , where c j ∈ C p , but
a i , c j ) is part of a stable solution. This implies that t p ′ is less than
r equal to s i j for every C p ′ , where c j ∈ C p ′ . This means that all thease, the unique stable solution is when both s 1 and s 2 are admitted to A , and sup- 
orted by the cutoff scores of 10 for both A and { A, B } . However, when considering 
he Hungarian policy, we have two significantly different stable matchings. In the 
rst, student-optimal one, s 3 is admitted to B and the stable cutoff scores are 11,0, 
nd 0 for A , B and { A, B } . Meanwhile in the student-pessimal solution everybody is 
ejected, and the cutoff scores are 0,0 and 11 for A , B and { A, B } , respectively. 
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Table 7 
The comparison of student-optimal (A-opt) and student-pessimal (C-opt) stable 
matchings for the case of ties and common quotas under the Hungarian, Irish and 
Chilean policies for the 2009-KRTK-previous instance. 
size of matching average rank # rejections 
policies A-opt. C-opt. A-opt. C-opt. A-opt. C-opt. 
Hungarian 78,851 78,778 1.6591 1.6605 120,141 120,360 
Irish 79,279 79,279 1.6519 1.6519 118,878 118,878 
Chilean 79,764 79,755 1.6412 1.6415 117,117 117,162 
Table 8 
The comparison of student-optimal (A-opt) and student-pessimal (C-opt) stable 
matchings for the case of ties and common quotas under the Hungarian, Irish and 
Chilean policies for the 2009-KRTK-admitted instance. 
size of matching average rank # rejections 
policies A-opt. C-opt. A-opt. C-opt. A-opt. C-opt. 
Hungarian 73,579 73,560 1.6910 1.6917 131,964 132,013 
Irish 74,272 74,272 1.6818 1.6818 130,224 130,224 

















































































B  rst applications at c j with score t p or greater should also be in- 
luded in the matching. However, this is in contradiction with the 
ssumption that (a i , c j ) / ∈ Ch H p (X ) . The same argument applies for
he Chilean policy. 
The preprocessing algorithm can use the above two lemmas it- 
ratively. When some of the first applications are set to be re- 
ected based on Lemma 4 then we can consider the second ap- 
lications of these rejected students as their first applications and 
pply Lemma 3 again, and so forth. 
For the 2008-Educatio instance by doing one round of the 
bove preprocessing algorithm we could already fix 23,138 appli- 
ations to be accepted (and thus the same number of students 
ssigned), and 14,991 applications to be rejected. As a result the 
un time of the longest running Hungarian version improved from 
58,949 seconds to 10,740. This improvement also enabled us to 
ompute the results for the 2009-KRTK instances to be presented 
ext. 
.6. Simulation results for the 2009-KRTK instances 
As we described in the Introduction, we created two in- 
tances using different assumptions on the constraints, “2009- 
RTK-previous” uses the quotas of the 2008-Educatio instance, and 
2009-KRTK-admitted” uses the number of admitted students for 
he quotas. In the one round preprocessing phase we could fix 
4,828 applications as accepted and 25,336 applications as re- 
ected for the “2009-KRTK-previous” instance, whereas we could 
x 18,902 applications as accepted and 40,404 applications as re- 
ected for the “2009-KRTK-admitted” instance. The main statistics 
f the computed solutions can be seen in Tables 7 and 8 , respec-
ively. 
. Conclusion 
Following up Ágoston et al. (2016) , we developed new (mixed) 
P formulations for the classical Gale-Shapley college admissions 
odel, for the case of ties and for the case of common quotas. 
e also considered the most challenging case when both ties and 
ommon quotas are present. We found that the most efficient for- 
ulations with binary cutoff scores can terminate in a reasonable 
ime for a real instance from 2008. Furthermore we also compared 
he three possible policies allowing ties, used in Hungary, Ireland 
nd Chile. 
One can consider to further improve our formulations and IP 
olution technique, perhaps also with more careful preprocessing 12 ailored for the application. Another important line of research 
ould be to provide more insight into the qualities of the mod- 
ls, what can be the reason of the different performances, whether 
ome models are tighter than others, and can give better bounds 
n the branching. 
For future work, one can also try to include lower quotas as the 
hird special feature that is present in the application. This special 
eature makes the problem NP-hard, but it has turned out to be 
ractable in practice with careful preprocessing and IP techniques 
y Ágoston et al. (2016) . Although it will be even more complicated 
o define the concepts of fairness, stability and non-wastefulness 
or this real scenario. The ultimate goal of our research project 
s going to be resolving this case as well designing an alternative 
possibly better) solution technique to the currently used heuristic 
pproach. 
In addition, we also propose the usage of our formulations for 
ther two-sided matching problems with distributional constraints. 
e believe that the flexibility of the robust IP technique can create 
 new perspective in solving complex matching problems under 
references with special objectives and constraints even for large 
arkets, as demonstrated in this paper. 
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